甘肃省关于农业特产收入征收农业税的实施办法（修正）
甘肃省人民政府
甘肃省关于农业特产收入征收农业税的实施办法（修正）
甘肃省人民政府
（1994年7月18日省政府令第9号发布1997年10月22日省政府令第27号修正）
第一条 为了合理调节农林牧渔各业生产收入，公平税负，促进农业生产全面发展，根据《国务院关于对农业特产收入征收农业税的规定》和财政部《关于农业特产税征收具体事项的通知》，结合我省实际，特制定本办法。
第二条 凡在我省境内从事本办法规定应税农业特产品生产的单位和个人，为农业特产农业税（以下简称农业特产税）的纳税义务人（以下简称纳税人）。纳税人包括国有农场、林场、军垦农场、劳改劳教农场、养殖场；承包经营的专业户、联营户、个体专业户和其他农户；有农业特
产品收入的企业（包括外商投资企业、外国企业）、事业单位、机关、部队、院（学）校、人民团体、寺庙、集体经济组织、合作经济组织等。上述纳税人都应按本办法缴纳农业特产税。
第三条 凡在我省境内收购烟叶、毛茶、银耳、黑木耳、水产品、原木、原竹、生漆、牲畜产品的单位和个人应当按照收购金额和规定的税率缴纳税款。
凡在我省境内收购前款所列应税产品以外的农业特产品的单位和个人为农业特产税的扣缴义务人。扣缴义务人包括供销合作社、烟草公司、林产公司、药材公司、水产部门、森工企业（包括地办林场）；个体购销专业户、联营户等。扣缴义务人从收购所支付的金额中代扣、代缴农业特
产税。
第四条 对下列农业特产品收入征收农业特产税：
（一）烟叶收入：包括晾晒烟、烤烟收入；
（二）园艺收入：
1．水果：包括苹果、柑桔、梨；
其它水果：包括杏、葡萄、李子、山楂、草莓、柿子、枣、猕猴桃、桃、干果；
2．毛茶：包括红毛茶、绿毛茶、乌龙毛茶等毛茶和边销茶原料（精制茶不在其列）；
3．花卉、苗木；
4．各种中药材（国家指令性生产的百号暂不征税）；
5．果用瓜：包括西瓜、白兰瓜、甜（香）瓜、黄河蜜瓜；
6．蚕茧：包括桑蚕茧、柞蚕茧；
7．啤酒花、黄花、孜然；
8．黑瓜籽、白瓜籽、葵花籽、植种瓜籽、无壳瓜籽；
（三）水产收入：包括淡水养殖（鱼、鱼苗、虾、甲鱼等）；
（四）林木收入：包括原木、原竹、生漆、板栗、毛栗、花椒、木本油料（油桐籽、核桃、药木籽）、芦苇、棕片、木炭、栓皮等其它林木收入；
（五）牲畜皮毛、乳产品收入：包括牛皮、猪皮、羊皮；羊毛、兔毛；羊绒、驼绒、乳酪、酥油等牲畜产品收入；
（六）食用菌收入：包括银耳、黑木耳、香菇、蘑菇、金针菇、原菌（菌种）等食用菌收入。
除上述规定应税品目外，地区行署，市、州、县（市、区）人民政府认为需要开征的应税品目及税率，须呈报省人民政府批准后执行。
第五条 农业特产税税目、税率依照本办法所附的农业特产税税目税率表执行。
第六条 农业特产税的应纳税额，按照农业特产品实际收入和规定的税率计算征收，农业特产品实际收入以人民币计算。
农业特产品实际收入，由当地征收机关按照农业特产品实际产量和国家规定的收购价格或者市场收购价格计算核定。计算公式：
农业特产品实际收入＝实际产量×收购价格
应税未税农业特产品连续加工的产成品，折算成原产品的实际收入征税。
收购烟叶，凡在收购环节由收购单位支付的从购货方取得的一切收入（含价外收入和其他各种补贴性收入），均应计入收购金额征收农业特产税。
凡纳税人将自产农业特产品交付给他人代销；委托加工用于非应税项目；用于投资、入股、集体福利、无偿赠送他人等，均应视同销售处理，一并计算缴纳税款。
第七条 农业特产税的减税、免税：
（一）农业科研机关和农业院校，从事科学实验所取得的农业特产品收入，持县以上科研部门所确定科研项目批文，在试验期间可给予免税；
（二）对新开发的荒山、荒坡、荒地、沙漠、水面上从事农业特产品生产的（不含黑瓜籽种植） ，从有收入起1—3年内可予免税；
（三）对老革命根据地、少数民族地区、边远地区、贫困地区及其他地区中尚未解决温饱问题的贫困户，纳税确有困难的，可给予减免税；
（四）对因自然灾害，造成农业特产品欠收的，根据欠收情况，酌情给予减免税；
（五）农户院内（宅基地范围内）的农业特产品收入，免征农业特产税；
（六）为绿化荒山荒坡自栽自育的苗木，可给予免税。
农业特产税的减免程序：个人申请减免税，经村委会签注意见，乡、镇财政机关审核，报县级财政机关批准后执行；单位申请减免税，经县级财政征收机关审核，报地、州、市财政机关批准后执行；对本办法列举的应税品目以及一个地区的减税、免税，由地、州、市财政机关申请，报
省财政厅审核，经财政部批准后执行。
第八条 农业特产品的纳税义务发生时间为农业特产品收获、出售的当天。
第九条 纳税人应当在纳税义务发生之日起30日内，向当地征收机关申报纳税。凡不能如实申报应税产品实际收入的，由纳税人按当地征收机关核定的计税收入缴纳税款。征收机关可根据各种农业特产品的生产、收获、出售时间，向纳税人规定具体的缴纳期限。
第十条 农业特产税由地方财政机关征收。
农业特产税的征收可采取多种方式，包括查帐征收、查定征收（即核定收入征收）、查验征收、定期定额征收等。
第十一条 生产应税农业特产品的单位和个人，其农业特产税向生产所在地财政征收机关缴纳。
税款由收购单位和个人缴纳或代扣代缴、代收代缴的，在收购地向财政征收机关缴纳农业特产税。
第十二条 经省财政厅决定或批准，可以委托有关单位代征农业特产税，并发给委托代征证书。受托单位要按照代征证书的要求，在财政征收机关的业务指导下，依法代征税款。
对代扣、代缴、代征税款的单位，由征收机关按所扣税款付给1％的手续费。
第十三条 农业特产税暂不征收地方附加。
农业特产税征收经费，由财政征收机关按实征税额的5％提取。
第十四条 农业特产税与农业税、牧业税的划分：
在农业税计税土地上生产农业特产品的，农业税照征，计算缴纳农业特产税时，将农业税扣除。
生产烟叶、牲畜产品的单位和个人仍依法缴纳农业税和牧业税。
第十五条 农业特产税的征收管理，按照本办法执行。本办法未尽事宜，按照《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》及其实施细则有关规定执行。禁止不问有无税源和税源多少，平均摊派收税。
第十六条 本办法执行中的具体问题由省地税局负责解释。
第十七条 1994纳税年度起，农业特产税依照本办法计算征收。原甘肃省人民政府发布的《甘肃省农林特产税暂行规定》（1989年5月15日甘政发〔1989〕65号文）同时废止。
附件：
农业特产税税目税率表
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
| | 适 用 税 率 |
| 税 目 |－－－－－－－－－|
| |生产环节|收购环节|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|一、烟叶产品 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．晾晒烟叶 | | 31％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．烤烟叶 | | 31％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|二、园艺产品 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．毛茶 | 7％| 16％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．柑桔、苹果、梨 | 12％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 3．杏、葡萄、李子、山楂、草莓、柿子、枣、| | |
| | 10％| |
| 桃、猕猴桃、干果 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 4．花卉、苗木 | 6％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 5．药材 | 7％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 6．果用瓜 | 8％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 7．蚕茧 | 8％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 8．啤酒花 | 8％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 9．黄花 | 6％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 10．黑瓜籽、白瓜籽 | 8％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 11．葵花籽、无壳瓜子 | 5％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 12．植种瓜籽 | 6％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 13．孜然 | 6％| |
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
| | 适 用 税 率 |
| 税 目 |－－－－－－－－－|
| |生产环节|收购环节|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|三、水产品 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．鱼、虾、甲鱼 | 8％| 5％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．鱼苗 | 5％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|四、林木产品 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．原木、原竹 | 8％| 8％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．生漆 | 10％| 10％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 3．板栗、毛栗、芦苇 | 6％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 4．油桐籽、药木籽 | 7％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 5．花椒、核桃 | 7％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 6．棕片、栓皮、木炭 | 5％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|五、牲畜产品 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．牛皮、猪皮、羊皮 | | 10％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．羊毛、兔毛 | | 10％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 3．羊绒、驼绒 | | 10％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 4．乳酪、酥油 | | 10％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
|六、食用菌 | | |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 1．黑木耳、银耳 | 8％| 8％|
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 2．香菇 | 8％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 3．蘑菇、金针菇 | 7％| |
|－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－|－－－－|－－－－|
| 4．原菌（菌种） | 6％| |
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
1994年7月18日
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
